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EUROPE’S NEW JURY SYSTEMS: THE
CASES OF SPAIN AND RUSSIA
STEPHEN C. THAMAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
The recent reintroduction of trial by jury in both Russia (1993) and Spain
(1995) is interesting for two reasons.  First, it is a surprising reversal in the long-
term trend toward the elimination of the classic jury in favor of either courts
composed exclusively of professional judges, or of “mixed courts” in which pro-
fessional judges and lay assessors collegially decide all questions of fact, law,
and sentence.  Second, it raises the question whether the jury can act as a cata-
lyst in the reform of Continental European criminal procedure, as it did during
the nineteenth century in the wake of the French Revolution.
The modern notions of procedural fairness in criminal procedure, which
have gained general international recognition in national constitutions and in-
ternational human rights conventions, have their origins in the following An-
glo-American concepts, which developed in the context of an adversarial trial
by jury: (l) the presumption of innocence, (2) the privilege against self-
incrimination, (3) the equality of arms, (4) the right to a public and oral trial,
(5) the accusatory principle, and (6) the judge’s independence from the execu-
tive or investigative agency.  The classic separation of powers within the adver-
sarial criminal process between a neutral judge, responsible for deciding ques-
tions of law and punishment, and a panel of lay persons responsible for
questions of fact and guilt, also gave rise to common law rules of evidence.  For
instance, the separation of powers inspired the regulation of hearsay and rele-
vance, the creation of exclusionary rules addressing excessively prejudicial and
illegally gathered evidence,1 and the adoption of the principle of “free evalua-
tion of the evidence” unfettered by formal rules of evidence.2  Important devel-
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1. John H. Langbein’s research has seriously called into question whether the Anglo-American
rules of evidence were attributable to the division of labor between the jury and the judge or to the
“lawyerization” of criminal trials in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.  See John H. Langbein, The
Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 306 (1978); cf. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA,
EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 26 (1997) (“A space for technical evidence law begins to open up only when
the trial court is split into two parts—one lay, the other professional.”).
2. Langbein also recognizes that the seeds of “free evaluation of evidence” were being planted in
Continental Europe before the introduction of trial by jury with the weakening of the institution of tor-
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opments affecting the presentation and evaluation of evidence in substantive
criminal law, the separation of factual and legal questions,3 and the dissection
of criminal offenses into their various constitutive objective and subjective
elements arguably have their roots in the need for the judge to instruct the jury
on how to apply the law to the facts of the case.4
Although most of the principles discussed above were accepted into the
formerly inquisitorial criminal procedures of civil law countries, the structural
framework in which they originated—the adversarial trial by jury—has largely
been rejected by the same countries as being alien to certain other principles of
the inquisitorial criminal process, such as (l) the duty of the state (prosecutor,
judge, and investigating judge) to ascertain the truth, (2) the necessity of re-
viewability of judgments, as reflected in the requirement of providing reasons
for findings of guilt or innocence,5 and (3) the principle of mandatory prosecu-
tion (“legality principle”).  The legality principle is antipathetic not only to the
unbridled “discretion” of juries to acquit out of sympathy or nullify the harsh-
ness of the sentence,6 but also to the apotheosis of party-control of the criminal
trial: plea-bargaining, a practice growing from the same soil as trial by jury in
England and the United States.7  Consequently, juries have largely been abol-
ished or converted into a form of lay participation more conducive to adhering
to the aforementioned principles: the “mixed court” of professional judges and
                                                          
ture and the rise of “poena extraordinaria.”  See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF
PROOF 59 (1977).  On the transformation of the “romantic notion” of intime conviction into the “less
expansive” notion of  freie Beweiswürdigung, which required adherence to “extralegal canons of valid
inference,” see DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 21.
3. Though Sir Edward Coke proclaimed “Ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices; ad quaes-
tionem juris non respondent juratores” as early as 1620, and early French and German jury legislation
tried to limit juries to deciding naked “historic facts,” leaving the application of the law to the profes-
sional bench, German, and later Russian, scholars quickly understood that the jury’s verdict of “guilty”
or “not guilty” was a mixed issue of law and fact.  The German response was to replace the classic jury
with the mixed court, or Schöffengericht, in which professional judges and lay assessors decide all is-
sues of law, fact, guilt, and sentence in joint session.  See John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial
Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY
1700-1900, at 13, 34 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987).  For a summary of the 19th century German
discussion, see Peter Landau, Schwurgerichte und Schöffengerichte in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert
bis 1870, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, supra, at 241, 279-81, and
HUGO MEYER, THAT- UND RECHTSFRAGE IM GESCHWORENENGERICHT, INSBESONDERE IN DER
FRAGESTELLUNG AN DIE GESCHWORENEN 109-280 (1860).
4. See Ennio Amodio, Giustizia popolare, garantismo e partecipazione, in I GIUDICI SENZA
TOGA. ESPERIENZE E PROSPETTIVE DELLA PARTECIPAZIONE POPOLARE AI GIUDIZI PENALI 1, 13
n.30 (Ennio Amodio ed., 1979).  The Russian Supreme Court has made the quantum leap to treating
the proof of actus reus as a factual question for the jury, and mens rea as a legal question for the pro-
fessional bench.  See text accompanying notes 90-92.
5. According to Amodio, Article III(1) of the Italian Constitution makes the reintroduction of
the classic jury impossible because it requires reasons to be provided for all judicial decisions.  See
Amodio, supra note 4, at 46-48.
6. On jury nullification in the United States, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L REV. 867,  871-75 (1994).
7. On the strange symbiosis of trial by jury and plea-bargaining, see Bernd Schünemann, Reflex-
ionen über die Zukunft des deutschen Strafverfahrens, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERD PFEIFFER 481
(1988).  (This document was unavailable to staff editors for cite-checking because it could not be re-
trieved from an archive.)
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lay assessors, collectively responsible for all questions of law, fact, guilt, and
sentence.
The tension between the principles and the structure of the jury system it
has produced in these civil law nations raises significant questions.  To what ex-
tent are the universally accepted principles derived from common law criminal
procedure dependent on the classic separation of powers in an adversarial jury
trial?8  Can a judge, who has studied the investigative file and determined, be-
fore the trial, that it includes sufficient evidence for a finding of guilt, preserve
the presumption of innocence and act as an impartial fact/guilt finder?9  Is the
classic jury system a useful catalyst for cementing the independence of the
judge from the executive or investigative branch in order to provide a founda-
tion for an objective “ascertainment of the truth”?10  If the judge has a duty to
uncover the truth and the defendant invokes his or her right to remain silent,
how effective is this right when the judge is also the finder of guilt?11  What is
the meaning of intime conviction, the French rendition of a “verdict according
to one’s conscience,” in a “mixed court,” where the presiding judge has unique
access to the dossier and is responsible for drafting the judgment (even in the
                                                          
8. For the proposition that French and German reformers, enamored with the Anglo-American
jury system, lost sight of the “interdependencies” between that system and the procedural and eviden-
tiary maxims of the adversary system, which were otherwise rejected, see Karl H. Kunert, Some Ob-
servations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules under the Common Law System and the Civil
Law System of “Free Proof” in the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 122, 147
(1967);  cf. Amodio, supra note 4, at 13 n.30; see also K.J. MITTERMAIER, DAS VOLKSGERICHT IN
GESTALT DER SCHWUR- UND SCHÖFFENGERICHTE 21 (1866) [hereinafter MITTERMAIER, DAS
VOLKSGERICHT]; K.J. MITTERMAIER, ERFAHRUNGEN ÜBER DIE WIRKSAMKEIT DER SCHWUR-
GERICHTE IN EUROPA UND AMERIKA 667 (1865) [hereinafter MITTERMAIER, ERFAHRUNGEN].  Mit-
termaier felt the principle of oral and public trials could be effectively implemented only in the form of
the classic jury trial.
9. Mittermaier doubted that judges, despite their best effort, could protect themselves from
forming an unconscious “preconceived opinion as to guilt” imbued by study of the dossier of the pre-
liminary investigation.  See MITTERMAIER, DAS VOLKSGERICHT, supra note 8, at 22; MITTERMAIER,
ERFAHRUNGEN, supra note 8, at 683.  Modern German views range from the ultra-pessimistic conten-
tion that German criminal procedure is a Potemkin facade and the trial an orchestrated blessing of the
results of the preliminary investigation, see Schünemann, supra note 7, at 482-83, to cautious assertions
that the preliminary study of the file, while strongly influencing the presiding judge, does not make him
or her incapable of objectively weighing the trial evidence, see CHRISTOPH RENNIG, DIE ENT-
SCHEIDUNGSFINDUNG DURCH SCHÖFFEN UND BERUFSRICHTER IN RECHTLICHER UND PSY-
CHOLOGISCHER SICHT 177, 223, 237, tbl. 10 (1993) (This document was unavailable to staff editors for
cite-checking because it could not be retrieved from an archive.); cf. Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary
Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 544 (1973).
10. In the Netherlands, the “pre-prepared version of the truth” is presented to the trial judge in
the form of the investigative dossier.  See Nico Jörg et al., Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems
Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 41, 46-47 (Phil Fennell et al.
eds., 1995).  The “Schulterschluß” between the trial judge and the prosecutor, and the “systematic dis-
tortion of the processing of information, caused by the judicial reconstruction of an historical situa-
tion” all constitute, according to its critics, “weaknesses of truth-finding hindered by inquisitorial pro-
cedure with an accusatory facade.”  See Schünemann, supra note 7, at 475-76, 479.
11. This question is answered by the fact that continental defendants virtually never remain silent
during the preliminary investigation or the trial itself.  See MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE
AND STATE AUTHORITY 128 (1986); Damaška, supra note 9, at 527.
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unlikely event he or she has been overruled by the lay assessors) in such a way
as to withstand the formal requirements of appellate scrutiny?12
This comparison of the provisions of the 1993 Russian Jury Law13 and the
1995 Spanish Jury Law14 will focus on the effect of their implementation and
reintroduction of the classic jury system on these questions and problems.15
The most notorious case to be prosecuted in either country, the case of Mikel
Otegi, exemplifies the fragility of the new jury systems.  Mikel Otegi, a young
Basque nationalist, murdered two Basque policemen and was acquitted on
March 7, 1997, on the grounds of diminished capacity caused by intoxication
and uncontrollable rage provoked by alleged previous police harassment.  The
acquittal shocked the Spanish public, prompting calls to amend or repeal the
jury law, or at least to suspend it in the Basque Country.
                                                          
12. As to the problems inherent in the presiding judge explaining the reasoning of the lay asses-
sors, especially if he or she has been outvoted by them, see Damaška, supra note 9, at 540, 543.  As to
how the freie Beweiswürdigung of the judge, through the necessity of its having to be based in “rules of
logic, experience of the laws of nature . . . and . . . probability,” has led to the re-emergence of new
“formal rules of evidence,” which it was supposed to have replaced, see id. at 540; DAMAŠKA, supra
note 11, at 20, 55; Kunert, supra note 8, at 124.  On the “guesswork” involved in the formulation of the
judgment in mixed courts, see DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 42-43.  In his early writings, Mittermaier
warned against “declaring legally-educated judges to be jurors” by allowing them to decide by freie
Beweiswürdigung, because this permission would place too much power into their hands.  See 1 C.J.A.
MITTERMAIER, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFVERFAHREN 222 (2d ed. 1832).
13. See Zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii o vnesenii izmeneniy i dopolneniy v Zakon RSFSR O su-
doustroystve RSFSR, Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks RSFSR, Ugolovnyy kodeks RSFSR i Kodeks
RSFSR ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh [Law of the Russian Federation on the Introduction
of Changes and Amendments to the Law of the RSFSR on Court Organization of the RSFSR, the
Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and the Code of the
RSFSR on Administrative Infractions], VEDOMOSTI RF, Issue No. 33, Item No. 1313, at 2238-64
(1993) [hereinafter Jury Law].  All citations are from Ugolovny Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii,
Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy Kodeks RSFSR, Ugolovno-ispolnitel’nyy Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii,
185-437 (Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation ed., INFRA/M-NORMA 1997).
The Jury Law amends several Russian codes.  The amended codes in the Jury Law will be cited as
Law on Court Organization [hereinafter LOC] and Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter UPK
RSFSR].
The right to jury trial was introduced in only nine of Russia’s 89 political units: Ivanovo, Moscow,
Riazan, Rostov-on-the-Don, Saratov and Ul’ianovsk Regions, Altay, Krasnodar, and Stavropol Terri-
tories.
14. Ley Orgánica del Tribunal del Jurado, B.O.E., 1995, 122 (amended by Ley Orgánica, B.O.E.,
1995, 275) [hereinafter LOTJ]; see also LEY DEL JURADO (Victor Moreno Catena ed., 2d ed. 1995).
15. The discussion of Russia will often refer to my own investigation of the first 114 trials in 1993-
94.  See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61 (1995)
[hereinafter Thaman, Resurrection].  For a more concise but more current treatment of the provisions
of the new law and its implementation, see Stephen C. Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenen-
gericht, 108 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 191 (1996) [hereinafter
Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht].  For a similar in-depth analysis of the new Spanish
jury system, see Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 241 (1998) [hereinafter Thaman, Spain Returns].  The comparison in this article includes new
Spanish and Russian material not included in an earlier article.  See Stephen C. Thaman, Geschwore-
nengerichte in Ost und West: Die klassische Jury und das adversarische Verfahren im Strafverfahren
Rulands und Spaniens, 41 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 73 (1997) [hereinafter Thaman, Geschworenen-
gerichte].
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II
BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While the liberal Spanish Constitutions of 1812, 1837, and 1869 provided for
some kind of trial by jury, the institution only found legislative form in the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 and, finally, in the Law on the Jury of
1888.  Only the latter law was implemented for any length of time, functioning
between 1888 and 1923, when it was suspended by the Primo de Rivera dicta-
torship, and then again between 1931 and 1936.16
Trial by jury was introduced in Russia during Alexander II’s judicial re-
forms of 1864 and survived, despite subsequent legislation removing political
and press crimes from its jurisdiction, until the Bolsheviks abolished it in 1917.17
Article 125 of the post-Franco Spanish Constitution of 1978 provided for
public participation in the administration of justice through the institution of
trial by jury.18  This provision was conceived as the key to democratic reform of
the criminal justice system following the Franco dictatorship.19  However, be-
tween 1978 and 1995, the majority of Spanish jurists questioned the appropri-
ateness of using the classic jury system as a catalyst for criminal justice reform.
They stressed the perceived inadequacies of the Spanish jury experience after
1888 and maintained either that Article 125 made lay participation optional,20
or even if Article 125 made lay participation a constitutional mandate, that the
“mixed jury” or escabinado would be constitutionally adequate as the equiva-
lent of the modern form of popular participation (following the models of
Germany, France, Italy, and Portugal).21
                                                          
16. For a history of jury trial legislation in 19th century Spain, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra
note 15, at 246-49 (citing JUAN ANTONIO ALEJANDRE, LA JUSTICIA POPULAR EN ESPAÑA: ANÁLYSIS
DE UNA EXPERIENCIA HISTÓRICA: LOS TRIBUNALES DE JURADOS 79-243 (1981)).
17. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 64-65.
18. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [Constitution] [C.E.] art. 125 (Spain).
19. The legislature noted that the suspension, abolition, or limitation of the jury trial in the period
1820-1939 always coincided with limitations of civil rights in periods of monarchic reaction or dictator-
ship.  See LOTJ § I, Exposición de Motivos, supra note 14.  Indeed, in nearly all Continental European
countries, the introduction of trial by jury coincided with liberal reforms, and its abolition with the in-
stallation of dictatorial or totalitarian regimes, for example, Bolshevism in Russia (1917), Fascism in
Italy (1931), the Vichy Regime in France (1943).  The only exception was Germany, in which the
democratic Weimar Government abolished the classic jury, albeit in an undemocratic manner, by the
Emminger decree of 1924.  See Ellison Kahn, Restore the Jury? Or “Reform? Reform? Aren’t Things
Bad Enough Already?,” 108 S. AFR. L.J. 672, 678 (1991).
20. A dubious precedent for the “optional” nature of constitutional commands can be found in the
Argentine Constitution of 1858, which called for trial by jury, but was never implemented with legisla-
tion.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 251 (citing RICARDO J. CAVALLERO & EDMUNDO
S. HENDLER, JUSTICIA Y PARTICIPACIÓN:  EL JUICIO POR JURADOS EN MATERIA PENAL 43-63
(1988)).
21. For summaries of these discussions, and an argument for the propriety of introducing a mixed
court in lieu of trial by jury, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 250-56 (citing AGUSTÍN-J.
PÉREZ-CRUZ MARTÍN, LA PARTICIPACIÓN POPULAR EN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DE JUSTICIA: EL
TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 322 (1991); Ernesto Pedraz Penalva, Sobre el significado y vigencia del Ju-
rado, in CONSTITUCIÓN, JURISDICCIÓN, Y PROCESO 60-62 (1990)).  Although lay judges in the mixed
courts of Germany, France, Italy, and Portugal deliberate with the professional bench, the courts in
each country are still called by the old name for jury courts.  On the German Schwurgericht, see
§§Z74(2), 74(d) Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, discussed in THEODOR KLEINKNECHT & KARLHEINZ
THAMAN.FMT5.DOC 08/02/99  4:10 PM
238 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 2
The movement toward recognizing adversarial trial procedure and trial by
jury as constitutional foundations of the Russian administration of justice22 be-
gan during Gorbachev’s perestroika and culminated in the Russian Jury Law.
The reform was aimed at replacing the traditional Soviet “mixed court,” which
had been completely ineffective as a popular corrective against judicial arbi-
trariness and party control of judicial decisionmaking.23
III
JURISDICTION OF THE JURY COURT
The defendant has a right to a jury trial in Russia in any case tried in Rus-
sia’s second-level courts of original jurisdiction.24  The Spanish legislature chose
to grant jurisdiction to second-level courts of original jurisdiction, the provin-
cial courts (audiencia provincial), on the basis of the magnitude of threatened
punishment25 and limited trial by jury to particular types of crimes, such as
crimes committed by public officials in the exercise of their duties, crimes
against persons, honor, liberty, and security, and arson.26
                                                          
MEYER, STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG 1447, 1453 (43d ed. 1997).  On the French cour d’assise, see § 240
Code de Procédure Pénale, reprinted in CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 363 (36th ed. 1994).  On the
Italian corte di assise, see Riodinamento dei Giudizi di Assise (L. 10 aprile 1951, n.287, Gazzelta Uffi-
ciale 7 maggio 1951, n.102), published in CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE CON LEGGI COM-
PLEMENTARI (Bolzano, 1991); see also CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE § 5, reprinted in IL NUOVO
CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE (LA TRIBUNA) 93 (Piacenza, 1995).  On the Portuguese júri, see
Código de Processo Penal Anotado § 51 (Coimbra, 4th ed. 1991).
22. Article 123 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 guarantees an adversarial
procedure and trial by jury.  See Konstitutsiia Rossiyskoy Federatsii (1993) [Constitution] [hereinafter
KONST. RF].
23. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 66-68.
24. See UPK RSFSR arts. 421, 36.  These jury cases are mainly capital crimes of aggravated mur-
der and rape.  Before the enactment of a new Russian Penal Code in 1996, juries also heard a smat-
tering of cases involving passing counterfeit currency and bribery.  Under the new Russian Penal
Code, the following crimes are also triable by the jury court: capital murder, aggravated rape, kidnap-
ping, commerce in children, hostage-taking resulting in death, terrorism, crimes of organized criminal
gangs, hijackings, mass rioting, piracy, negligent operation of public transportation resulting in death,
train-wrecking resulting in death, treason, espionage, attacks against government officials and the po-
lice, various types of obstruction of justice, war crimes, genocide, ecocide, and having an accessory af-
ter the fact in the commission of a serious offense.  See UPK RSFSR art. 36, referring to Ugolovnyy
Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii, supra note 13, at 3-181, arts. 105(2), 126(3), 131(3), 152(3), 205, 206(2),
206(3), 208(1), 209-11, 212(1), 227, 263(3), 267(3), 275-79, 281, 290(3), 290(4), 294-302, 303(2), 303(3),
304, 305, 316, 317, 318, 321(3), 322(2), 353-58, 359(1), 359(2), 360.  The pertinent courts are called
“regional courts” or “territorial courts,” depending on the type of federal political entity involved.
25. The Law on the Judiciary (Ley del Poder Judicial), before its amendment by the LOTJ, origi-
nally provided that the competence of the jury court would be determined in relation to the type of
crime and the quantity of the punishment designated.  See Ley del Poder Judicial, art. 83(2)(d)
(B.O.E., 1985, 157).  In the United States, the right to jury trial inures when the crime with which the
defendant is charged is punishable by more than six months deprivation of liberty.  See Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
26. See LOTJ art. 1.  The law has been criticized for including comparatively trivial crimes such as
bribery of public officials, and minor threats and trespasses within the jury court’s jurisdiction, and ex-
cluding serious crimes against the person such as rape.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at
261-62 (citing Vicente Gimeno Sendra, La segunda reforma urgente de la Ley del Jurado, EL
TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 27-28 (1996); JUAN-LUIS GÓMEZ COLOMER, EL PROCESO PENAL ESPECIAL
ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 33-34 (1996)).  Prosecutors and courts in Spain have assiduously
avoided jury trials for such minor offenses.  Fifty-seven of the first 75 trials in Spain of which the
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In Russia and the United States, the defendant may waive his or her proce-
dural right to trial by jury.  In Russia, a large portion of defendants waive their
right to a jury trial, in favor of being tried by the traditional court of lay asses-
sors or by a three-judge panel.27  In Spain, on the other hand, jury courts have
exclusive jurisdiction because the right to a jury trial embodies the citizens’
right to participate in the administration of justice as jurors.
IV
COMPOSITION OF THE JURY COURT
The jury court is composed of nine jurors and two alternates in Spain and
twelve jurors and two alternates in Russia.  One professional judge presides
over the court in both countries.28
Voter registration lists serve as the source for prospective jurors in both
Spain and Russia.29  Although the right to vote inures at age eighteen in both
countries, Russia has restricted jury eligibility to registered voters who are
twenty-five years of age or older.30  Both countries exempt certain public offi-
cials, as well as officials in the legal and law enforcement professions, and allow
discretionary excuses for age, hardship, or illness.31
In both countries, the jury for a particular case is selected from at least
twenty prospective jurors who have been preliminarily screened and sum-
moned to the court on the day of trial.32  After brief questioning of the juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial in the case,33 the prosecution and the defense
                                                          
author is aware were for murder.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 258-63.  In Russia, only
twelve of the first 109 jury trials involved noncapital offenses.  See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note
15, at 135-37.
27. It is questionable whether these “waivers” are voluntary; many believe that they are the result
of coercion or undue influence exerted by investigators, defense lawyers, or judges at the preliminary
hearings.  See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 87-88; see also Thaman, Das neue russische
Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 195.  In 1994, the first full year of jury trials in the nine regions,
only 20.4% of defendants chose trial by jury, but the percentage rose to 30.9% in 1995, 37.3% in 1996,
and 37% in 1997.  The option of being tried by a three-judge panel has not been fully implemented due
to a lack of judicial resources.  It was exercised only 76 times in 1994 and 61 times in 1995.  See
Spravka, Memorandum of A.P. Shurygin, President of the Cassation Panel of the SCRF (1998)
[hereinafter Spravka]; Praktika realizatsii novykh form ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva [On Realization
of New Forms of Criminal Procedure] 4  (1997) (memo of Cassational Panel of the Supreme Court of
the Russian Federation, on file with author) [hereinafter Praktika realizatsii].
28. See LOTJ art. 2; UPK RSFSR art. 440.  Nineteenth century legislation in both countries pro-
vided for a jury of twelve, presided by a three-judge panel.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15,
at 264.
29. See LOTJ art. 8; LOC art. 80.
30. See LOTJ art. 8; LOC art. 80.
31. See LOTJ arts. 9-12; LOC art. 80.
32. See LOTJ art. 38; UPK RSFSR art. 434.
33. The judge conducts this questioning in Russia.  See UPK RSFSR art. 438.  In Spain, as in many
U.S. jurisdictions, the judge turns over questioning to the parties.  See LOTJ art. 40.  Jury selection in
Spain has lasted anywhere from 30 minutes to nearly seven hours in the first trial in Bilbao.  See Tha-
man, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 291 (citing Interview with Jose Maria Alavrez Seijo, Presiding
Judge of Oviedo Provincial Court, Oviedo (June 9, 1997); Interview with Remigio Conde Salgado,
President of Lugo Provincial Court, Lugo (June 10, 1997); JAVIER MUÑOZ, !Una sola puñalada y la
mato, caramba!, EL CORREO, Apr. 8, 1997).  Some Spanish lawyers have hired psychologists to aid
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may exercise challenges for cause, or peremptorily challenge a limited number
of prospective jurors (two each in Russia, four each in Spain).34
V
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND PRELIMINARY HEARING IN JURY CASES
The Russian jury law did not introduce changes in the procedure of the
preliminary investigation, in which a legally trained official in the Ministry of
the Interior or the Procurary independently and inquisitorially (that is, guided
by a duty to seek the truth) collects evidence and determines whether a charge
will be referred to the Procuracy for indictment.35  The Spanish Jury Law, on
the other hand, has provided for the active participation of both the defense
and the prosecution following the investigative judge’s determination that the
crime charged is subject to the jury court’s jurisdiction.36  Once the parties are
notified of the court’s jurisdiction, the law provides for adversarial proceedings
in which the parties may solidify their accusatory and defense pleadings and re-
quest further investigative measures.37
The preliminary hearing in Spain is conducted by the investigative judge
and is considered an extension of the preliminary investigation.  The hearing
takes place after the performance of indispensable investigative acts and the
defendant’s submission of a provisional response to the accusatory pleadings.38
At the hearing, the parties may request that the investigative judge perform
further investigative acts, move to dismiss the charges or the entire accusation,
or amend the charges to include a separate crime related to the “justiciable
facts.”39  If the evidence is sufficient to charge the defendant with a crime sub-
ject to the jury court’s jurisdiction, the judge issues an order setting the defen-
dant’s case for trial.40
                                                          
them in voir dire and have often probed the biases and prejudices of the jury in a sophisticated manner.
See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 288-91 (citing Salvador Enguix, Juicio al Jurado, LA
VANGUARDIA, June 2, 1996, at 4-5).
34. See LOTJ art. 40; UPK RSFSR art. 439.
35. At the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the investigator, a legally-trained official in
the Ministry of the Interior or the Procuracy, advises the defendant of his right to a jury trial in the
mandatory presence of his counsel.  See UPK RSFSR arts. 423, 424.
36. See LOTJ art. 25-28.
37. See id. art. 29.  This “adversarialization” of the preliminary investigation, and the correspond-
ing limitation of the powers of the investigative judge, has been criticized on grounds of equal protec-
tion (in that nonjury accuseds do not have similar rights), and as being beyond the scope of a law to
introduce trial by jury.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 273-74 (citing VICENTE GIMENO
SENDRA, LEY ORGÁNICA DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, COMENTARIOS PRÁTICOS AL NUEVO
PROCESO PENAL ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 165-66 (1996); Victor Fairén Guillén, Comentarios
al “Anteproyecto del Ley del Jurado,” 2 REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL 462 (1994)).
38. See LOTJ arts. 30-31.  Unlike the procedure in nonjury trials, where the investigative judge
must investigate the alleged crimes “with all the circumstances which could influence its qualification
and the guilt of the criminals,” L.E. CRIM. art. 299, the jury procedure provides for investigation only
upon motion of one of the parties, and only of subject matter relevant to probable cause to charge the
crime, see LOTJ art. 27.
39. See LOTJ art. 31.
40. See id. art. 32.
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The Russian preliminary hearing is conducted by the trial judge, who re-
views the entire dossier of the preliminary investigation before deciding
whether to set the case for trial and what evidence will be admissible at trial.
Though the hearing is adversarial in nature, no new evidence is adduced and
rulings suppressing evidence must be based on the contents of the investigative
dossier.  If the judge determines that there is insufficient evidence to proceed to
trial, he or she may dismiss the case.  However, the more common remedy is
for the judge to return the case to the investigator for supplementary investiga-
tion.41
The Russian legislature has left the central role of the investigative dossier
intact, but the Spanish legislature has modeled its preliminary hearing on that
of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 198842 by largely eliminating the
investigative dossier from the trial to reinforce the principal of immediacy and
orality of the trial in the jury court.43  During the preliminary hearing, the inves-
tigative judge prepares a “trial file.”  This file includes evidence that cannot be
repeated at trial or that needs to be ratified at trial, or other evidence the par-
ties intend to use at trial.44
The Russian constitutional prohibition against the use of evidence seized in
violation of the Russian Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure has
been remarkably implemented through the Russian preliminary hearing.45  In
particular, numerous defendants’ admissions and confessions have been held
inadmissible because they were elicited in violation of the defendant’s right to
                                                          
41. Supplementary investigation was performed in 18% of all cases tried from November 1, 1993,
to January 1, 1995, according to the statistics of the Russian Supreme Court [hereinafter SCRF].  See
Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 195.  The Russian Ministry of Jus-
tice contends that 36.1% of jury cases were returned for further investigation in 1994 and 36% in 1995.
See A. Gagarsky, Miniust podvodit itogi raboty sudov, 8 ROSSIYSKAIA YUSTITSIIA 4 (1996)
[hereinafter ROSS. IUST.].  The percentage has fallen to 25.8% in 1996 and 22.5% in 1997.  See Spravka
o praktike rassmotrenii del sudami prisiazhnykh v 1997 godu, Memorandum prepared by G.P. Ivanov,
Judge of the SCRF 3-4 (Mar. 21, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Spravka].
42. In Italy, however, the preliminary hearing judge (guidice per le indagini preliminari) is sepa-
rate from the trial judge, presiding only over matters arising during investigation.  This difference en-
sures a greater amount of structural independence.  See Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the
New Italian Criminal Procedure, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 364-65 (1994).  For analysis of the “double
file” innovation in the new Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, see Hans-Heinrich Jescheck,
Grundgedanken der neuen italienischen Strafprozeßordnung in rechtsvergleichender Sicht, FEST-
SCHRIFT FÜR ARTHUR KAUFMANN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 659 (1993); Alessandro Honert, Der
italienische Strafprozeß: die Fortentwicklung einer Reform, 106 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 427, 436 (1994).  (The last document was unavailable to staff editors for
cite-checking because it could not be retrieved from an archive.)
43. See LOTJ III: Exposición de Motivos.  The principal of immediacy and orality ensures that the
evidence will be heard first-hand through the testimony of witnesses, rather than through the reading
of documents.
44. See LOTJ art. 34.  For more detail on preliminary hearings, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra
note 15, at 279-82.
45. See KONST. RF art. 50.  The constitutional right to exclude illegally gathered evidence was
codified in UPK RSFSR arts. 69, 433.  For a discussion of this emerging body of law, see Thaman, Das
neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 196-97, and Thaman, Resurrection, supra note
15, at 90-94.
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counsel, which adheres in capital investigations from the moment of arrest,46 or
because the suspect was not advised of his or her constitutional right to remain
silent.47  Russian courts have also explicitly applied the “fruits of the poisonous
tree” doctrine in suppressing certain evidence, such as semen or blood stains on
clothing or objects that were not handled according to code specifications when
they were gathered.48  Motions to suppress evidence may also be made at trial,
where witness testimony often reveals that evidence was illegally seized.  Tes-
timony regarding the motion is required.  The illegality of investigative meth-
ods is often first revealed through witness testimony, and the parties may call
additional witnesses in support of, or in opposition to, the motion.49
Motions to suppress evidence which allege the violation of a fundamental
right during the preliminary investigation are made in Spain in preliminary
proceedings in the trial court.50  The efficacy of this remedy has been doubted
because the trial judge does not possess the full investigative dossier and there
are no provisions for hearing oral testimony.51  Thus, it is generally conceded
that such motions will have to be resolved at trial, though, to the author’s
knowledge, defendants have made no such motions during the first year of jury
cases.52
                                                          
46. All persons have a right to counsel upon arrest.  See UPK RSFSR art. 47.  Those charged with
capital crimes have a right to a court-appointed lawyer from the time of the filing of an accusatory
pleading.  See id. art. 49(5).  The right inures in jury cases from the time the investigation is completed.
See id. art. 426.
47. See KONST. RF art. 51.  The SCRF has held that all suspects must be advised of their right to
remain silent before being questioned during the preliminary investigation, or the statements are in-
admissible in court.  See Decision No. 8 of the Plenum Verkhovnogo Suda RF, O nekotorykh vopro-
sakh primeneniia sudami Konstitutsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii pri osushchestvlenii pravosudiia, 1 BIULL.
VERKH. SUDA RF 3, 6 ¶ 18 (1996).  Evidence was suppressed on constitutional or lesser statutory
grounds in approximately one third of all jury cases in 1994 and 1995, not including those cases re-
turned for further investigation.  See V. Voskresenskiy, Uchastie prokurora v rassmotrenii del, 7 ROSS.
IUST. 4 (1996).  The main author of the Jury Law estimates that evidence has been suppressed in 70%
of all jury cases.  See S.A. Pashin, Dokazatel’stva v rossiyskom ugolovnom protsesse, in 2 SOSTI-
AZATEL’NOE PRAVOSUDIE 311, 368 (S.A. Pashin et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter SOST. PRAVO.].
48. See U. Liakhov & V. Zolotykh, Sud prisiazhnykh—put’ k spravedlivoy yustitsii, 3 ROSS. IUST.
10-11 (1997).
49. The SCRF approved this practice in Decision No. 9 of the Plenum Verkhovnogo Suda RF, O
nekotorykh voprosakh primeneniia sudami ugolovno-protsessual’nykh norm, reglamentiruiushchikh
proizvodstvo v sude prisiazhnykh, 3 BIULL. VERKH. SUDA RF 2, 4,  ¶ 7 (1995) [hereinafter SCRF De-
cision No. 9].
50. See LOTJ art. 36(1).
51. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 283-84 (citing GÓMEZ COLOMER, supra note 26,
at 99).
52. According to the President of the Provincial Court of Málaga, Manuel Torres Vela, the lack of
motions to suppress based on search and seizure violations has been due to the fact that no narcotics
charges are heard by juries, and that the typical Spanish murder case, involving “crimes of passion” or
bar-room fights, seldom involve searches or wiretaps.  See id. at 284.
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VI
THE TRIAL
A.  The Changing Roles of the Participants
One of the key aims of the Russian legislature was to strip the trial judge of
the inquisitorial duty of seeking the truth and to eliminate the accusatory role
the Soviet-Russian procedure had imposed on the court.  Therefore, the judge
no longer reads the accusatory pleading nor dominates the questioning of the
defendant and the witnesses in the new jury trials.  The judge may no longer
prevent the prosecutor’s abandonment of the case, act as a prosecutor by ne-
cessity when the prosecutor does not appear for trial, nor return the case to the
investigator on his or her own motion.53
The Spanish criminal trial was perhaps the most adversarial on the Euro-
pean Continent even before the passage of the jury law.54  Although the Span-
ish jury law kept the trial procedure basically unchanged, the trial judge’s abil-
ity to control the collection of evidence has been drastically impeded by the
lack of access to the investigative dossier.  The trial begins not only with the
reading of the prosecution’s accusatory pleadings, but also with the pleadings of
the defendant and the private prosecutor, usually representing the alleged vic-
tim, the victim’s family, or their representatives.55
Russian and Spanish jury trials are greatly impacted by the empowerment
of the victim or aggrieved party in criminal procedure.56  In both countries, a
prosecutorial motion to dismiss may be granted only if the aggrieved (the pri-
vate prosecutor) agrees.57  In the Russian trial, the aggrieved is usually unedu-
cated, not represented by counsel, and often has no knowledge of the investiga-
tion and evidence.  The aggrieved party has had a disturbing effect in many
trials by displaying unpredictable outbursts of emotion, blurting out inadmissi-
ble or suppressed evidence, and necessitating laborious explanations by the
                                                          
53. See Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 199-201.  I have criti-
cized the judge’s excessive discretion to remand a case for further investigation even after the jury has
been sworn and has heard evidence.  Such practice violates the presumption of innocence and the right
to one’s lawful judge, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the KONST. RF.  See Stephen Thaman, Sud prisi-
azhnykh v sovremennoy Rossii glazami amerikanskogo yurista, in 2 GOSUDARSTVO Y PRAVO 67, 70-71
(1995).  Russian commentators have expressed similar criticism.  See U. Liakhov, Sudebnoe sledstvie v
sude prisiazhnykh, in SOSTIAZATEL’NOE PRAVOSUDIE 63, 80-81 (S.A. Pashin et al. eds., 1996); see also
Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 100-01.
54. The duty of the judge to ascertain the truth was phrased in terms of “conducting the trial tak-
ing care to prevent discussions which are impertinent or do not aim at establishing the truth, without
restricting the liberty necessary for the defense.” Art. 683 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal
(B.O.E. 1882, 126) [hereinafter L.E. CRIM].  Very similar language has been adopted by the new Rus-
sian jury law.  See UPK RSFSR art. 429.
55. See L.E. CRIM. art. 649.  The aggrieved party also has the right to court-appointed counsel in
case of indigency.  See id. art. 119.
56. In the United States, the aggrieved is not a party in criminal proceedings, has no right to ques-
tion witnesses, make a statement, or argue to the jury.  The aggrieved's only input would be as a wit-
ness.  For criticism of this state of affairs, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME:
PROTECTING VICTIM’S RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 248-50 (1996).
57. See  UPK RSFSR art. § 430; LOTJ art. 51.
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judge about every aspect of the proceeding.58  Whereas the Russian Supreme
Court has winked at the victim’s illegal disclosure of the defendant’s prior
criminal record to the jury to the point of affirming a death sentence in the face
of such a procedural error,59 it has reversed acquittals because the trial judge
continued the case in the absence of the aggrieved party.60
In Spain, the aggrieved party is invariably represented by counsel in the
trial and has had a strong impact on the jury in several of the first cases.  In par-
ticular, the presence of the aggrieved in the courtroom has weakened the de-
fendant’s supposed advantages in being the sole “common citizen” arguing to a
jury of his peers against the prosecutor, the representative of the state.  The
presence of the victim’s counsel has created a “good cop-bad cop” situation,
where the public prosecutor pursues a “just resolution” of the case and the pri-
vate prosecutor screams for blood.61  This situation also allows the victim’s
counsel to push a certain theory of the case primarily aimed at a greater mone-
tary award.62
B.  Proceedings Preliminary to the Taking of Evidence
Russia and Spain follow the Continental European model of evidentiary
proceedings.  The proceedings commence with the reading of the accusatory
pleading and the defendant’s plea, and continue with the interrogation of the
defendant and the testimony of witnesses and experts.  The trial closes with the
summations and the last word of the defendant.63  The provisions of the extant
Codes of Criminal Procedure remain in force in both countries to the extent
they are not in contradiction with the provisions of the new jury laws.64
                                                          
58. On the role of the victim, see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 107-08.
59. The RF Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty in the Case of Stepanenko (Saratov Re-
gional Court), although the aggrieved revealed the defendant’s criminal record to the jury.  The judge
interrupted the aggrieved and instructed the jury to disregard the statement.  Supreme Court Decision
of Sept. 17, 1996 (Case of Stepanenko), Case No. 32 kp-096-7sksp.
60. See Supreme Court Decision of Nov. 3, 1996 (Case of Karakaev), Case No. 18 kp-096-87sp
(reversing the acquittal of the Krasnodar Territorial court); Supreme Court Decision of Oct. 8, 1996
(Case of Bulychev), Case No. 32 kp-096-55sp (reversing the acquittal of the Saratov Regional Court in
a double-murder case).
61. In the first case in Granada, the prosecutor and the defense asked the jury to acquit a 71-year-
old woman on insanity grounds after all three psychiatric experts agreed she was completely irrespon-
sible when she stabbed her 86-year-old neighbor to death.  The private prosecutor asked for a guilty
verdict based on partial lack of responsibility, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.  See Thaman,
Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 397-99.  The private prosecutor invariably requests a higher prison
sentence and damages than the public prosecutor and sometimes pleads more serious criminal charges.
See id. at 399-400.
62. In the second Barcelona trial, the private prosecutor was represented by a former television
personality who was successful in convincing the jury that the defendant was guilty of only attempted
murder of a taxi-driver, in order to support his civil suit for 50 million pesetas against the city govern-
ment and the taxi company for causing the death by being dilatory in getting an ambulance to the
scene.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 399-400 (citing Carmen Muñoz, La fiscal pide una
pena menor por la muerte del taxista, EL PERIÓDICO, Sept. 20, 1996, at 26; Blanca Cia, El jurado dice
que el acusado no quiso matar al taxista, EL PAÍS (Catalan Edition), Sept. 21, 1996, at 1,7).
63. For a summary of the Russian procedure, see Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenen-
gericht, supra note 15, at 202-04.  For a summary of the Spanish procedure, see L.E. CRIM. arts. 688-93.
64. See UPK RSFSR art. 420; LOTJ art. 24.
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In Spain, the parties, including the victim, are allowed to make an opening
statement, following the reading of the pleadings.  The statement grants the
parties an opportunity to explain their pleadings, list the facts they believe will
be proved, and state the verdict and sentence they believe will be just; they may
even propose the hearing of new evidence.65  The Russian legislation does not
provide the parties with the same opportunity.
C.  Pleas of Guilty
In both countries, the defendant is first asked if he or she admits the charges
brought against him or her.66  In Spain, pleas of guilty conforming to the
pleadings and the longest requested sentence of either the prosecutor or the
private prosecutor are permitted in jury and nonjury trials if the sentence does
not exceed six years of deprivation of liberty and there is no question as to the
presence of a corpus delicti for the crime or any objection from the defense
counsel.  Upon reaching conformity, or conformidad, the trial is terminated and
sentence is imposed.67  The Spanish practice of conformidad is similar to one of
the new Italian forms of abbreviated procedures, the applicazione della pena su
richiesta delle parti.68  Coupled with the early and active adversarial participa-
tion of the defense, prosecution, and victim in both the preliminary criminal in-
vestigation and the trial, the practice is the best example of a “reprivatization of
the criminal law” on the basis of a consensual model proposed by some Ger-
man commentators.69  Although the Russian law allows a defendant to plead
guilty before the jury and condones, with the consent of the judge and all the
                                                          
65. See LOTJ art. 45.  Opening statements are also a part of the U.S. criminal trial.
66. See UPK RSFSR art. 278; L.E. CRIM. arts. 688-90.
67. See L.E. CRIM. arts. 694-95.  The Jury Law only mentions conformidad after the evidence has
been taken, see LOTJ art. 50, and some courts have deemed it necessary to select a jury and hear the
evidence before resolving an undisputed case.  This was done in the first Madrid case, the second
Castellón case, and the second Bilbao case; the Bilbao judge openly condemned this perceived neces-
sity.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 314-15 (citing Un juez de Bilbao pide que se eviten
vistas con jurado “sin contenido,” EL CORREO, May 23, 1997).  Most commentators have deemed that
such an interpretation of the law would be uneconomical and would lead defendants to test the waters
at trial before agreeing to plead guilty.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 312 (citing
GIMENO SENDRA, supra note 37, at 191-92).  In practice, the great majority of minor nonhomicide
cases are resolved either through a conformidad or by manipulating the charges to avoid the jury
court’s jurisdiction.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 311-12.
68. For discussion of the “application of punishment upon the request of the parties,” see Frec-
cero, supra note 42, at 372-74, and William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17
YALE J. INT’L. L. 1, 23-26 (1992).
69. A guilty plea would follow a thorough criminal investigation in which the defendant and the
victim would have full participatory rights, rights of discovery, and an opportunity to have their own
evidence evaluated.  A trial would be the last resort for difficult cases, but all evidence taken with the
participation of both parties in the preliminary investigation would be admissible.  See JÜRGEN
WOLTER, ASPEKTE EINER STRAFPROZEßREFORM BIS 2007, at 65-91 (1991); Thomas Weigend, Die
Reform des Strafverfahrens, 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 486,
496-511 (1992).  (The last document was unavailable to staff editors for cite-checking because it could
not be retrieved from an archive.)  For detail, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 309-16.
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parties, an abbreviated trial or even the taking of no evidence, the jury must
still deliberate and decide the defendant’s fate.70
D.  The Taking of the Evidence
Trials in both countries begin with an admonition to the defendant of his
right not to testify and his privilege against self-incrimination.71  If the defen-
dant waives these rights, the prosecutor begins the examination of the defen-
dant.72  The defendant has given a statement waiving his or her right to testify
and to avoid self-incrimination in nearly all of the first Spanish trials.  The same
was true in all but one of the first 114 Russian trials, though some judges al-
lowed the defendant to hear the prosecution’s case before deciding whether to
testify, as is the practice in the United States.  For criminal justice systems that
place emphasis on the presumption of innocence, the prosecution’s burden of
proof, and the defendant’s right to remain silent, the interrogation of the de-
fendant before any incriminating evidence has been presented to the factfinder
is a lingering inquisitorial vestige in these two systems.73
In both Russian and Spanish jury trials, the questioning of the witnesses is
initially left to the parties, with the opponents having a right to cross-examine.
The judge intervenes only after the parties have finished their questioning.74
Russian judges have maintained a dominant, inquisitorial role much more so
than their Spanish counterparts.75  Both jury laws allow jurors to submit writ-
                                                          
70. See UPK RSFSR art. 446.  A jury acquitted a Russian man of capital murder and rape after his
guilty plea.  See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 104-05, 159-60.  In the pre-revolutionary Rus-
sian jury system, Russian defendants used to plead guilty and express their remorse, winning an acquit-
tal from the jury.  For instance, one woman, charged with attempting to poison her husband, ignored
her lawyer’s advice to plead guilty and denied the charges in her testimony.  The jury convicted her
and sentenced her to hard labor in Siberia.  When her lawyer asked why she did such a stupid thing,
she replied that if she were acquitted, she would have to go back to living with her husband!  See N.P
TIMOFEEV, SUD PRISIAZHNYKH V ROSSII. SUBEBNYE OCHERKI 23-25 (1881).  (This document was
unavailable to staff editors for cite-checking because it could not be retrieved from an archive.)  In up
to 95% of all criminal cases in the United States, the defendant elects to waive his right to trial by jury
and enters a “plea bargain” in exchange for a sentence guaranteed to be less than if the defendant had
gone to trial and was convicted.  See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 625 (3d. ed. 1993).
71. See L.E. CRIM. art. 688.
72. See id. arts. 699-700; UPK RSFSR arts. 278, 446.
73. For Russian criticism of this practice, see Liakhov, supra note 53, at 69; V. Zolotykh, Sudebnoe
sledstvie v sude prisiazhnykh, in 3 VESTNIK SARATOVSKOY GOSUDARSTVENNOY AKADEMII PRAVA
189, 191 (C.V. Naumov et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter VESTN. SAR. GOS. AKAD. PRAVA]; cf. Thaman,
Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 297.
74. See UPK RSFSR art. 446; L.E. CRIM. art. 708.
75. In the four Spanish trials I saw (the first trials in Palma de Mallorca, Valladolid, Granada, and
Córdoba), the trial judges asked few if any questions, leaving the conduct of the evidentiary portion of
the trial entirely in the hands of the prosecutor and lawyers.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note
15, at 307.  Russian judges have been criticized for first asking witnesses to give a general explanation
of their knowledge of the case, and then asking follow-up questions to “clarify” matters, leaving little
opportunity  for the parties to dispel the opinion already created in the minds of the jury.  See S.A. Na-
sonov, Sudebnoe sledstvie v sude prisiazhnykh: zakonodatel´stvo, teoriia, praktika, in 3 VESTN. SAR.
GOS. AKAD. PRAVA, supra note 73, at 170, 174.  However, some Russian judges adopted a completely
passive role, as would befit a U.S. judge.  See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 102-09; Thaman,
Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 202-03.
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ten, unobjectionable questions to be asked by the presiding judge.76
The Russian jury law does not attempt to limit the jury court’s access to the
preliminary investigation file, nor to regulate the use of prior statements of
witnesses or defendants included therein.77  In Spain, however, the trial judge
does not conduct the preliminary hearing and the evidentiary file is not physi-
cally present at the trial.  Thus, the trial judge’s knowledge, as well as that of
the jurors, is restricted to the evidence introduced at trial.  This difference in
procedure effectively prevents a Spanish judge from assuming the inquisitorial
role of his Russian counterpart.
Although the Spanish jury law allows the parties to question witnesses
about prior statements that contradict their testimony at trial, these statements
may not be read into evidence, nor are they admissible for the truth of the mat-
ter stated.78  The new procedure has presented problems, however, for the law-
yers.  In the three murder trials I observed in Valladolid, Granada, and Cór-
doba, the defendants, while testifying, denied that they remembered what
happened on the day of the homicide.  Without being able to use the state-
ments from the preliminary investigation, prosecutors found it very difficult to
impeach the alleged lack of memory of the defendants, leading to an interroga-
tion confusing for jurors and audience alike.79
The new Russian law prohibiting the introduction of illegally gathered evi-
dence presents some complicated tactical problems for Russian defendants be-
cause jury acquittals can be appealed by the prosecutor or the aggrieved.  First,
many acquittals have been reversed by the Supreme Court of the Russian Fed-
eration (“SCRF”) because the trial judge excluded evidence which the high
                                                          
76. See LOTJ art. 46(1).  In a study of 54 cases in 1994, it was determined that jurors were much
more active than lay assessors in Russian “mixed courts” in questioning witnesses and defendants.  Of
the questions asked by the court, 56% were asked by the presiding judge and 43% by the jurors.  See
M.V. NEMYTINA, ROSSIYSKIY SUD PRISIAZHNYKH 32 (1995).  One Saratov judge noted that the more
he let the parties examine the witnesses, the more jurors intervened with questions in response to the
lawyers’ inability to cover crucial areas of testimony effectively.  See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note
15, at 106.  Active jury questioning happened in Spain on occasion, but was not the rule.  See Thaman,
Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 304-06.
77. In cases where witnesses failed to appear in court in the first Russian trials, extensive reading
from the dossier was common in order to impeach the defendant or witnesses.  See Thaman, Resurrec-
tion, supra note 15, at 107.
78. See LOTJ art. 46(5).  The same evidentiary procedure was introduced in the Italian Code of
Criminal procedure of 1988, only to be annulled by the Constitutional Court and by subsequent legisla-
tion.  See Honert, supra note 42, at 436.  In Spanish trials before professional judges, prior statements
may be read in court to impeach in-court statements.  See L.E. CRIM. art. 714.
79. Even prior trial testimony is inadmissible in a retrial.  Thus, in the first retrial of a Spanish jury
case in Castellón, the defendant changed his testimony to improve his self-defense claim and the
prosecution could not use his prior testimony because it was unsworn, as Spanish defendants are not
required to testify under oath, and because the reversal of the defendant’s conviction had rendered the
case a “nullity.”  The defendant was acquitted the second time around.  See Thaman, Spain Returns,
supra note 15, at 300 (citing Interview with Antonio Gastaldi Mateo, Public Prosecutor in the
Castellón Provincial Court (June 20, 1997)).  For detail on the banishment of the investigation dossier
from the trial court and the problems it has caused, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 298-
301.
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court’s Cassational Panel deemed admissible.80  Thus, lawyers must carefully
evaluate whether to move to exclude questionably prejudicial evidence.  In ad-
dition, in some early trials, defense lawyers would sometimes wait until trial to
move to exclude the evidence so the judge would not return the case for further
investigation, and so the jury could hear the testimony about the unlawful tac-
tics of criminal investigators.81  In several cases, the Cassational Panel of the
SCRF has reversed acquittals because the defense had unsuccessfully moved to
exclude allegedly coerced confessions and then had, either through the testi-
mony of the defendant, other witnesses, or through the defense lawyer’s closing
argument, alluded to the allegedly unlawful actions of the interrogators.82
Finally, the Russian legislation prohibits mention of a defendant’s past
criminal record before the jury.83  To achieve parity, the SCRF ruled en banc
that the defendant may not introduce good character evidence before the jury.84
                                                          
80. The following acquittals have been reversed for this reason: Supreme Court Decision of Sept.
1, 1994 (Case of Bulochnikov), Case No. 51kp-094-68sp (reversing acquittal of the Altay Territorial
Court for murder of two persons); Supreme Court Decision of Nov. 24, 1994 (Case of Shchepakin),
Case No. 41-kp-094-112sp (reversing acquittal of Rostov-on-the-Don Regional Court for murder); Su-
preme Court Decision of Dec. 13, 1994 (Case of Sushko), Case No. 19-kp-094-72sp (reversing an ac-
quittal of the Stravopol Territorial Court for the murder of two persons); Supreme Court Decision of
Jan. 18, 1995, Case No. 32-kp-094-70sp (reversing acquittal of the Saratov Regional Court for an at-
tempted murder and theft); Supreme Court Decision of Oct. 26, 1995 (Case of Volkov), Case No. 4-kp-
095-94sp (reversing acquittal of the Moscow regional Court for the murder of two persons, arson, and
destruction of property); Supreme Court Decision of Feb. 20, 1997 (Case of
Nikitin/Savchenko/Bovisov/Grishin), Case No. 4-kp-097-13sp (reversing acquittals of the Moscow Re-
gional Court for murder, destruction of property, and other crimes); Supreme Court Decision of Apr.
16, 1997 (Case of Vlasov/Vlasov/Kovalev), Case No. 41-kp-097-32sp (reversing convictions of Rostov-
on-the-Don Regional Court for robbery-murder).
81. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 92.
82. The President of the Cassational Panel of the SCRF discusses several such cases in A. Shury-
gin, Zashchita v sudoproizvodstve s uchastiem kollegii prisiazhnykh zasedateley, 9 ROSS. IUST. 6
(1997).  Human rights activists, aware of the fact that criminal investigators in Russia still employ tor-
ture and other tools in their “technology of confessions,” have sharply criticized these rulings for de-
priving juries of evidence about the voluntariness of confessions and the credibility of the defendant.
See Pashin, supra note 47, at 344; Stanislav Velikoredchanin, Sud prisiazhnykh v Rossii, in 25 PRAVA
CHELOVEKA V ROSSII: INFORMATSIANNAIA SET’ 11, 11-12 (Stanislav Velikoredchanin ed., 1997).  The
following acquittals were reversed for this reason: Supreme Court Decision of Nov. 24, 1995 (Case of
Zhevak), Case No. 41-kp-096-24sp (reversing acquittals of the Rostov-on-the-Don Regional Court for
murder); Supreme Court Decision of May 14, 1996 (Case of Kornilov/Nikilenko/Gerner), Case No. 41-
kp-96-39sp (reversing the acquittal of the Rostov-on-the-Don Regional Court for the murder of sev-
eral people in a bombing); Supreme Court Decision of Apr. 19, 1997 (Case of Antipov), Case No. 41-
kp-097-27sp (reversing the acquital of the the Rostov-on-the-Don Regional Court for the rape of a mi-
nor); Supreme Court Decision of May 7, 1997 (Case of Grigoriev), Case No. 51-kp-097-26sp (reversing
the acquittal of the Altay Regional Court for the rape of a minor); Supreme Court Decision of May 29,
1997 (Case of Popov), Case No. 32-kp-097-21sp (reversing the acquittal of the Saratov Regional Court
for a robbery-murder).
83. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 103.  For instance, the defendant’s criminal record
must be omitted from the reading of the indictment.  See UPK RSFSR art. 446.  On the other hand, the
jury has received questions related to proving prior convictions of defendants in Spanish cases when
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is pleaded.  Thus in the Ugal/Martínez case in the Barce-
lona Provincial Court, the jury proved four prior convictions for Ugal and nine for Martínez.  See
Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 347.
84. See SCRF Decision No. 9, supra note 49, ¶ 16.  In the case of Gusiev/Poliakov, an acquittal for
robbery-murder was reversed because the defense read records of the defendant’s illness to the jury
and told the jury that an earlier conviction had been reversed by the SCRF.  See Supreme Court Deci-
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This ruling hinders the defense in presenting “sympathy” evidence to the jury
inducing them to recommend leniency.  Since “sympathy” evidence can help
eliminate the possibility of the death penalty, its omission has been strongly
criticized.85  For example, the SCRF has even upheld the conviction of an ar-
guably “battered” woman for the aggravated murder of her husband even
though she was prevented from introducing evidence of his bad character.  The
court held that admission of such evidence would turn the case into a trial of
the victim.86
E.  The Role of Judge and Jury in Rendering Judgment
Both the Russian and Spanish legislatures have rejected the Anglo-
American general verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.”  Instead, Russia and Spain
have followed the French model, later adopted by most Continental European
countries in the nineteenth century, whereby the jury is presented with a list of
questions or propositions.87
Before arguments and the defendant’s last word, the Spanish judge pre-
pares a verdict form (objeto del veredicto) in the form of a list of propositions,
some designated as favorable to the defendant, some as unfavorable.  The jury
must then decide whether they were proved or not proved during the trial.  The
propositions are restricted to the facts presented by the various parties during
the trial and relate to the elements of the crimes charged, conditions which
modify or exclude guilt, and statutory factors that aggravate or mitigate the de-
fendant’s criminal responsibility.  Finally, the jury is asked to affirm or deny the
proof of the defendant’s guilt as to the “criminal acts” (hechos delictivos) con-
tained in the parties’ pleadings.  If the jury believes that guilt has been proved
as to one or more of the allegations, it may nevertheless recommend a suspen-
sion of sentence (remisión condicional de la pena) or ask that the government
grant complete or partial amnesty for the offense (recomendación del indulto).88
The judge’s proposed verdict form must be discussed with the parties; the par-
ties’ objections to the form’s contents may form the basis for an appeal.89
                                                          
sion of Apr. 30, 1997 (Case of Gusiev/Poliakov), Case No. 19 kp-097-15sp (reversing decision of Stav-
ropol Territorial Court).
85. Defense lawyers still manage to present “sympathy” evidence before the jury.  See generally
Nasonov, supra note 75, at 183-85; Pashin, supra note 47, at 385.
86. See Supreme Court Decision of June 3, 1997 (Case of Shayko), Case No. 80 kp-097-28sp
(affirming conviction handed down by Ul’ianovsk Regional Court).  The woman, in an earlier trial, had
been convicted of murder in the heat of passion, caused by a serious insult delivered by her husband.
The SCRF reversed the conviction, finding that the “nature” of the questions asked constituted an
abuse of the judge’s authority.  See Supreme Court Decision of Sept. 24, 1996 (Case of Shayko), Case
No. 80-kp-096-33sp (Ul’ianovsk Regional Court).
87. See MEYER, supra note 3, at 48-108.
88. See LOTJ art. 52.  Unlike the Spanish “recommendation,” the Russian jury’s finding of
“lenience” or “special lenience” binds the judge in substantially lowering the sentencing parameters.
See UPK RSFSR arts. 449, 460; see also Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note
16, at 206.
89. See LOTJ art. 53.
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The Russian “question list” requires the posing of three basic questions: (l)
whether the corpus delicti of the crime has been proved; (2) whether the defen-
dant’s identity as perpetrator of the crime has been proved; and (3) whether he
or she is guilty of having committed the crime.90
Both legislatures resorted to the “question list” verdict form to give the pro-
fessional judge a factual foundation for the imposition of a reasoned judgment.
The factual foundation is a statutory or constitutional requirement in both
countries.91  Both legislatures equivocated, however, on whether they actually
wished to limit the jury to deciding mere “naked historical facts” or allowing it
to make a finding of “guilty” or “not guilty” as to each charged offense.  While
the Russian statute prohibits the judge from posing questions which require
“strictly juridical evaluations,” it also requires the judge to instruct the jury on
the substantive law as it applies to the acts imputed to the defendant, thus
seeming to indicate that the jury is to apply the law to the facts.  The SCRF,
however, has interpreted the statutory language to reduce the jury to deciding
only “naked historical facts,” depriving it even of deciding “internal fact ele-
ments” or mens rea, by characterizing it as a “question of law.”92
Spanish courts have wrestled with similar problems.  Most courts have tried
to phrase questions of guilt in terms of the defendant’s “having caused the
death” of the victim and have eschewed using the nomen juris in their formula-
tions.  This has not been true in questions related to mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, however, and juries have been asked directly whether a murder
was committed with treachery (alevosía) or excessive cruelty (ensañamiento),
often including definitions phrased in legal terminology within the question it-
self.  Spanish courts have also not shied away from asking juries directly about
the defendant’s mental state, for example, whether a homicide was committed
intentionally, recklessly, with gross negligence, with simple negligence, or acci-
dentally.93  According to some commentators, one of the main reasons for sev-
eral of the more criticized verdicts in the country is jurors’ hesitance to find
“intent” in the domestic and bar-room “crimes of passion” typical of many
                                                          
90. See UPK RSFSR art. 449.  For a detailed discussion of the problems encountered by Russian
judges in drafting the question lists in the first trials, see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 114-
23.
91. See CONSTITUTIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] art. 120(3) (Spain); UPK RSFSR arts. 314, 462.
92. In SCRF’s Opinion No. 9, supra note 49, ¶ 18, the Court held that the jury lacked competence
to decide “juridical questions,” such as whether a murder was intentional, negligent, or committed in
the heat of passion or for financial gain, whether it was committed with a “hooliganistic” motivation,
extreme cruelty, or excessive force in self-defense, or whether an act amounted to robbery or rape.  I
have criticized the jurisprudence of the SCRF, drawing on the pre-revolutionary practice and theory
discussed in Stephen Thaman, Postanovka voprosov v sovremennom Rossiyskom sude prisiazhnykh, 10
ROSS. IUST. 8-11 (1995) [hereinafter Thaman, Postanovka voprosov]; see also Thaman, Das neue rus-
sische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 205-06.  For similar criticism, see NEMYTINA, supra note
76, at 83.  While mens rea is a “question of fact” for the jury to decide in U.S. trials, the U.S. Supreme
Court has recently decided that it does not violate due process to statutorily prevent the jury from
hearing evidence relevant to the proof of the defendant’s mental state, for example, evidence of in-
toxication.  See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42-44 (1996).
93. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 320-51, for a detailed study of the Spanish ques-
tion lists.  See id. at 335-46 on questions relating to mental states.
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Spanish homicides.  This has led judges to instruct juries seriously as to the dif-
ference between intentional and reckless murder, as well as the difference be-
tween homicide with gross or simple negligence.94
The Russian system separates the guilt question into three component
parts, thereby permitting implicit jury nullification by allowing an acquittal
even though the jury has determined that the corpus delicti and the defendant’s
perpetration of the criminal acts has been proved.  In the famous Vera Zasulich
case of 1878, the jury acquitted a young revolutionary sympathizer of shooting
a Tsarist official by availing itself of this option of a “not guilty” verdict, even
though all of the elements of the crime had been proved.95  Spanish law treats
contradictions between the questions of corpus delicti, the identity of the perpe-
trator and guilt as a defect in the verdict which the jury is instructed to correct.96
The Spanish system is more explicit in reducing the jury’s role in determin-
ing “guilt” by limiting the scope of the jury’s involvement to finding that the de-
fendant committed a certain criminal act rather than a finding that a “crime”
was committed in the juridical sense.97  The stricter “anti-nullification” ap-
proach of the Spanish legislature did not, however, prevent the stunning acquit-
tal of Mikel Otegi of the murder of two policemen in the Basque Country.  The
jury was able to acquit the young man, despite clear evidence of an intentional
double murder, because questions of mens rea, including questions of dimin-
ished capacity and insanity as a complete excuse for criminal conduct, are con-
sidered to be “questions of fact” for the jury to decide.  Spain also permits a
complete excuse on grounds of temporary insanity, even when caused by volun-
                                                          
94. This was the opinion of the President of Sevilla Provincial Court.  See Thaman, Spain Returns,
supra note 15, at 340, 355 (citing Miguel Carmona Ruano & José Manuel De Paúl, Informe sobre las
Causas Juzgadas por el Tribunal del Jurado 68-69 (1997) (unpublished draft commissioned by CGPJ,
on file with the author)).
95. For discussions of pre-revolutionary Russian jury nullification in the context of the new stat-
ute, see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 114-15; Thaman, Postanovka voprosov, supra note 92,
at 9.  In a case from the Ivanovo Region, a jury affirmatively answered the corpus delicti and perpetra-
tion questions.  The victim had been stabbed to death, his woman friend, the defendant, had perpe-
trated the killing, and no legal excuses or justifications had been proved.  Nevertheless, the jury found
her “not guilty” of the murder and the SCRF upheld the judgment.  See Thaman, Geschworenen-
gerichte, supra note 15, at 79 n.66.  In commenting on the SCRF decision affirming this case, the chief
author of the jury law noted that one interpretation of the “not guilty” verdict under the Russian law is
that “the act contains all the elements of the crime in its totality, but the jury, for reasons known to
them, deprived the state of the right to achieve a conviction and apply the sanctions of the special part
of the Penal Code.”  S.A. Pashin, Postanovka voprosov pered kollegiey prisiazhnykh zasedateley, in 1
SOST. PRAVO., supra note 47, at 89, 90-91.
96. See LOTJ art. 63(1)(d).  This happened in the second Málaga trial, a prosecution for trespass
and threats, in which the jury found the principle fact questions to be proved, yet returned a verdict of
“not guilty.”  The judge returned the verdict for “correction,” explaining its supposed contradictor-
iness, and the jury blithely found the principle fact questions (as to corpus delicti and perpetration) to
be “not proved” and revalidated its acquittal.  See Carmona Ruano & De Paúl, supra note 94, at 7.  On
the Spanish attempt to prevent jury nullification, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 376-80.
97. LOTJ art. 60(1) originally called for a finding of guilt or lack thereof as to each “charged
crime” (delito imputado). In November 1995, the language was changed to “charged criminal act”
(hecho delictivo imputado) to effect a clean separation of questions of law from questions of fact.  See
Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 336.  Thus, as one critic noted, it is no longer a guilt-finding
in the strict meaning of the word and is actually superfluous in the technical sense.  See Thaman, Spain
Returns, supra note 15, at 378 n. 609 (citing GÓMEZ COLOMER, supra note 26, at 122).
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tary intoxication or other causes.98  In Russia, the judge must discharge the jury
and initiate psychiatric commitment procedures if evidence of mental illness
eliminating criminal responsibility arises.99  Until the promulgation of a new
penal code in 1996, the question of voluntary intoxication, a veritable national
pastime in Russia, was only presented to the jury as a circumstance that aggra-
vates the defendant’s level of guilt.  Despite this statutory aggravating factor,
which also existed before the Russian Revolution, Russian jurors have tended
to mitigate the responsibility of intoxicated defendants and have generally rec-
ommended lenience.100
As in the first Russian trials, some Spanish judges have limited the proposi-
tions in the verdict form to those absolutely necessary to prove the elements of
the offenses and the mitigating or aggravating circumstances,101 whereas others
have had the jurors affirm or reject virtually every assertion contained in the
prosecution and defense pleadings.  For example, of the fifty-four propositions
submitted to the first Valladolid jury, several had no relation to important ele-
ments of the offense.102  Interviews of the jury in the notorious Otegi case in
San Sebastián revealed they had great trouble understanding the ninety-five
questions submitted to them.103
                                                          
98. In the Otegi Case, the bulk of the defense’s 64 questions related to defendant’s drinking the
evening and morning before the killings and his prior encounters with the Basque police.  The jury af-
firmed by majority vote the following questions: (Q69): Mr. Mikel Mirena Otegi Unanue has a person-
ality with a propensity or predisposition to experience feelings of harrassment and persecution on the
part of the Ertzaintza; (Q70): In Mr. Mikel Mirena Otegi Unanue there exists a pre-existing pathologi-
cal condition or an ailment or an underlying psychic disturbance in connection with the aforemen-
tioned sense of harrassment and persecution by the Ertzaintza, which he experienced in extreme ways
intolerable for his personality; (Q76): Mikel Mirena Otegi Unanue consumed an excessive quantity of
alcoholic beverages between the afternoon and evening of December 9 and 10, 1995, until he achieved
a state of inebriation; (Q77): The conjunction of all of the facts laid out in numbers 69 through 76 of
Part C, or, in the alternative, of those which have been declared proved, had as a result that in the
moment of firing the weapon Mr. Mikel Mirena Otegi Unanue was absolutely not in control of his ac-
tions.  See Verdict Form from the Otegi Case in San Sebastián Provincial Court (Mar. 7, 1997) (on file
with author).
99. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 127.
100. Eighty-nine defendants in 76 of the first 109 Russian trials to reach a verdict were found to be
intoxicated (an aggravating factor) at the time of commission of the crime.  The jury recommended
leniency to 47 of those defendants.  Pre-revolutionary observers of jury trials in Russia also found that
the “views of jurors about the condition of drunkenness at the moment of the commission of a crime
are diametrically opposed to those provisions of the law dealing with this object.”  TIMOFEEV, supra
note 70, at 381; cf. BOBRISHCHEV-PUSHKIN, EMPIRICHESKIE ZAKONY DEIATEL’NOSTI RUSSKOGO
SUDA PRISIAZHNYKH 355-56 (1896).  (This document was unavailable to staff editors for cite-checking
because it could not be retrieved from an archive.)
101. For example, only nine and six propositions, respectively, were submitted to the juries in the
first murder cases in Palencia and Granada.
102. This subsequently elicited much criticism in the press, and the judge admitted the difficulty he
had with the verdict in a newspaper interview.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 332-33
(citing Juan Carlos León, El jurado nos libera de una responsabilidad, EL NORTE DEL CASTILLO, June
16, 1996, at 10-11).
103. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 333 (citing Carmen Gurrucha & Juan Carlos Es-
cudier, La caótica actuación del jurado del ‘caso Otegi,  EL MUNDO, Apr. 22, 1997, at 6-7).  In one Rus-
sian trial, 1,047 questions were submitted to the jury.  See Interview with V.P. Stepalin, Judge of the
Cassational Panel of the SCRF (Aug. 20, 1998) (on file with author).
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Following the preparation of the verdict form, the arguments of the parties,
and the defendant’s last word, the presiding judge in Spain instructs the jury in
a restrained manner and in a form the jury can understand as to (1) the jury’s
function, (2) the content of the verdict form, (3) the nature of the facts under
discussion, those that determine the circumstances constituting the crime(s)
charged and those that refer to allegations of exclusion and modification of
guilt, (4) the rules of deliberation and voting, and (5) the form of their final
verdict.104  The judge must be sure to maintain strict impartiality during the
summation and must instruct the jurors not to consider any evidence declared
inadmissible at trial.105  The judge also instructs the jurors to resolve all doubts
in favor of the defendant.106  Spanish judges have differing views on whether
they should instruct juries on the legal elements of the charged crimes, inas-
much as the law expressly restricts the jury to deciding  solely whether the
charged acts were committed.107  Even though the SCRF has in fact reduced
Russian jurors to judges of “naked acts,” and does not even let them decide
mens rea questions, the judge still gives a complete instruction on the substan-
tive law during his or her summation.  The judge is also required to summarize
the evidence and the positions of the parties,108 a practice adhered to in Spain
from 1888 until 1931, when it was repealed because it was seen as tantamount
to an ultimate accusation by the supposedly neutral bench at the end of the trial
when no response was afforded to the defense.109  Several convictions have been
reversed by the SCRF because of the one-sidedness of the presiding judge’s
summation, or because he or she neglected to mention some of the evidence.110
F.  Deliberation, Verdict, and Judgment
Jury deliberations in both Russia and Spain are entirely secret.  The pre-
siding judge is not allowed to participate and jurors may not reveal any infor-
                                                          
104. See LOTJ art. 54.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Thus in the first Granada and Córdoba murder trials, the trial judges scarcely mentioned the
elements of the charged crimes.  Author’s Observations at Trial (May 5-9, 1997).  Trial judges in Lugo,
Sevilla, and Girona agreed with this interpretation of the law.  See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note
15, at 354 (citing Interview with Edgar Armando Fernández Cloos, Trial Judge in Lugo Provincial
Court (June 16, 1997); Interview with Antonio Gil Merino, Trial Judge in Sevilla Provincial Court
(June 16, 1997); Interview with Fernando Lacaba Sánchez, Trial Judge in Girona Provincial Court
(June 26, 1997)).  On the other hand, the judge in the first trial in Vitoria explained in the judgment
how difficult it was to explain to the jury the difference between intentional murder, reckless murder,
homicide with gross and simple negligence, and accident.  See id. at 355.
108. See UPK RSFSR. art. 451; see also Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra
note 15, at 207.
109. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 356 (citing FRANCISCO MARES ROGER & JOSÉ-
ANTONIO MORA ALARCÓN, COMENTARIOS A LA LEY DEL JURADO 359 (1996)).
110. See Shurygin, supra note 82, at 7.  A counsel’s objection to a lack of objectivity in a summation
must be on the record in order to preserve the issue on appeal.  See UPK RSFSR art. 451.  This objec-
tion should be made in the presence of the jury so as to give the judge a chance to correct any possible
errors.  See id.
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mation about the deliberations.111  In Spain, seven of nine votes are required to
prove any propositions unfavorable to the defendant, whereas only five votes
are needed to prove any proposition favorable to the accused.  Jurors are also
allowed to alter the propositions submitted to them as long as they do not sub-
stantially alter the subject of their deliberations and the alterations do not re-
sult in an aggravation of the possible criminal responsibility of the defendant.112
Similarly, “guilty” verdicts require seven votes while “not guilty” verdicts or
recommendations of suspension of sentence and clemency require only five.113
The jury can request more instructions or clarifications as to the verdict form,
and if the jury has not voted after two days of deliberations, the judge can call
them into court to determine whether they have had any problems under-
standing the verdict form.114
While the detailed special verdicts used in Spanish and Russian cases cer-
tainly enable the sentencing and appellate judges to divine the reasoning proc-
ess of the jury, Spain has gone one step further and required that the jury give a
succinct rationale for their verdict, indicating the evidence upon which the ver-
dict was based and the reasons for finding a particular proposition proved or
not proved.115  Other than a nonbinding statement by the jury provided for in
the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure,116 this is the clearest attempt yet by a
legislature to require that juries justify their verdicts.
While some juries gave fairly elaborate explanations of why they found a
charge to be proven (for example, by explaining why they believed a witness, or
did not believe the defendant, or by pointing to expert testimony), many juries
just provided stock phrases like “testimony of witnesses and experts,” or
“evidence, experts, defendant’s testimony.”117  The ultimate minimalist variant
was that of the jurors in the second Málaga case; that jury just wrote:
“witnesses.”118
                                                          
111. See LOTJ arts. 55-56; UPK RSFSR art. 452.
112. See LOTJ art. 59.
113. See id. art. 60.  A guilty verdict in Russia requires seven of the twelve jurors’ votes, whereas six
votes are sufficient for an acquittal or for a finding favorable to the defendant.  See UPK RSFSR art.
454.
114. See LOTJ art. 57.  Russian jurors must strive for unanimity during the first three hours of de-
liberation, whereafter they may seek to reach a majority decision.  See UPK RSFSR art. 453.  Juries
seldom deliberate more than the three minimum hours.
115. See LOTJ art. 61(1).  This innovation was deemed necessary to comport with art. 120(3) of the
Spanish Constitution.  CONSTITUTIÓN ESPAÑOLA  [C.E.] art. 120(3).  It was also deemed necessary to
comply with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by art. 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution and
art. 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.  See id. art. 24(2); Eur. Conv. on H.R., Dec.
10, 1948, art. 6(2); Thaman, Spain Returms, supra note 15, at 364 (citing GIMENO SENDRA, supra note
37, at 320).
116. See art. 331(e) StPO.  It is a contested point, however, whether the reasons stated in the
“Niederschrift” may be used as a basis for attacking the factual findings of the jury.  See Einhard
Steininger, Die Anfechtung mangelhafter Tatsachenfeststellungen im Geschworenenverfahren, 47
ÖSTERREICHISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 686, 688-91 (1992).
117. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 365-67 (citing Carmona Ruano & De Paúl, supra
note 94, at 54), for a list of such “reasons,” categorized as “minimal.”
118. See id. at 355.
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Prior to the Otegi Case, some commentators opined that requiring juries to
give reasons for acquittals would violate the presumption of innocence and the
principal of “free evaluation of the evidence,” since an appellate court, when
reviewing a jury’s verdict, need only affirm that objective elements of proof
exist which could have permitted the jury to reach a certain conclusion.119  In-
deed, many of the acquittal verdicts were phrased in terms of doubt as to the
sufficiency of the proof.120  On June 27, 1997, however, the Superior Court of
Justice of the Basque Country reversed the Otegi acquittal based on the insuf-
ficiency of the rationale given by the jury, believing that the jury had basically
made just bald assertions of reasonable doubt.  After lamenting that the jury
did not give even a minimal explanation for its answers to the ninety-one fac-
tual questions, and provided only a “pseudo-motivation or substitute global
motivation,” the Court expounded:
The invocation of doubt and the references to that which the law requires—with
which the jury pretends to support its answers, which they forgot to give reasons for
before—reveal that the jury, camouflaging with perplexity a psychological state which
has nothing to do with serious hesitation, invents the existence of a doubt which it
gratuitously prejudges, in order to use the prop of Art. 54(3) of the law.  Armed with
the protection of this precept, the jury proclaims that it is plagued by doubt, that it
finds it impossible to dissipate it and that, because of it, it is resolving the issue in the
sense most favorable to the defendant.  It does not describe from where the doubt
arose, nor the magnitude thereof, nor is any notion apparent of the force employed to
overcome the doubt or clear up the difficulties to which it has given rise.121
To avoid deficiencies with the verdict, the jury may request that the secre-
tary of the court help them in drafting the verdict.122  Some commentators have
seen this as the first step toward, or a subliminal recognition of what is in their
opinion the superiority of the mixed court with lay assessors.123  Indeed, in a few
of the first trials, the legally trained secretary answered substantive legal ques-
tions posed by the jury.124
                                                          
119. See id. at 372 (citing José Antonio Díaz Cabiale, Prueba, Veredicto, Deliberación y Sentencia,
in COMENTARIOS SISTEMÁTICOS A LA LEY DEL JURADO Y A LA REFORMA DE LA PRISIÓN PRE-
VENTIVA 276, 290 (Agustín Pérez-Cruz Martín et. als. eds., 1996); MARÉS ROGER & MORA
ALARCÓN, supra note 109, at 398).
120. An example would be the acquittal of the defendant in the first Ávila trial for failing to render
aid after a traffic accident: “After we heard all the testimony of witnesses and experts, the evidence
was not sufficient to declare the defendant guilty.”  Verdict Form from the Barrero Case in Ávila Pro-
vincial Court (Oct. 7, 1996) (on file with author), reprinted in Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at
371-72.
121. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 373 (citing Aurora Intxausti, Otegi volverá a ser
juzgado por matar a dos “ertzainas,” EL PAÍS, June 28, 1997, at 13).  For a general discussion on the
Spanish reasoned verdicts, see Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 364-74.  The Otegi reversal
was upheld by the Spanish Supreme Court.  See STS, Mar. 11, 1998 (B.J.C. 4226, 6-13).
122. See LOTJ art. 61(2).
123. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 375 (citing GIMENO SENDRA, supra note 26, at
34-35; GÓMEZ COLOMER, supra note 26, at 124).
124. The secretary in the second Oviedo trial told me that she not only explained to the jury the
effect of recommendations of clemency or a suspended sentence, but also the difference between a
complete and partial excuse from criminal responsibility due to psychic disturbance.  See Thaman,
Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 375 (citing Interview with Evelia Alonso Crespo, Secretary in Oviedo
Provincial Court (June 9, 1997)).  See generally id. at 374-76.
THAMAN.FMT5.DOC 08/02/99  4:10 PM
256 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 2
After receiving the verdict from the jury, the judge must review the verdict
for defects and ask the jury to make any necessary corrections.  In a Spanish
case, if the judge returns the jury three times to correct defects in the verdict,
and they fail to do so, he or she may dissolve the jury and retry the case before
a new jury.  If the new jury also fails to reach a verdict due to similar problems,
the judge must, on his or her own motion, enter a verdict of acquittal.125
The judge’s ruling following a guilty verdict in both countries must be based
on the facts found to be true by the jury, which the judge then juridically quali-
fies before imposing sentence.126  Spanish judges have expressed frustration at
having to justify jury verdicts with which they do not agree, a situation which
judges could face in mixed courts, in the unlikely event they were outvoted by
the lay assessors.  In a twenty-six-page judgment, the judge in the thirteenth
Barcelona trial expressed his disagreement with a jury’s finding that the defen-
dant did not intend to kill, when he stabbed his female companion seven times
in areas of her body containing vital organs.  The judge lamented, “In the mind
of the jurist a certain pain emerges, from the point of view of judicial tech-
nique” when one must justify a judgment when the facts “collide with the inter-
pretative criteria which jurisprudence utilizes to determine the intentionality of
an agent.”127  The judge in the second Córdoba trial criticized a jury’s verdict
which compelled him to sentence a man to thirty years in prison as “the senti-
ments of the common people, struggling in the nadir of a long process of deca-
dence,” and added,
There are times when the soul is buffeted about by anxiety when the knowledge of
ancestral criteria of the technical application of the law is brought down in an instant
by simple inclinations of personal sensibility, replete with honesty, but nevertheless
deprived of even the simplest sense of legal culture.128
                                                          
125. See LOTJ art. 65.  The Russian judge may also return the jury to the jury room to correct con-
tradictions in their verdict.  See UPK RSFSR art. 456.
126. See LOTJ art. 70; UPK RSFSR art. 459.  Judgments of guilt and acquittals may be appealed in
both Russia and Spain.  Spain provides for a first appeal, in which new evidence may be adduced, an
appeal in cassation, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Spain.  See L.E. CRIM. art. 846(a)-(c).
Russia provides only one level of appeal in cassation, followed by a direct appeal to the SCRF.  See
UPK RSFSR arts. 463, 464.
127. Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 385-86 (citing Francesco Peirón, Un juez critica el
veredicto de un jurado que sólo consideró imprudencia matar a una mujer a puñaladas, EL PAÍS, May
31, 1997).  The judgment in the case of Domingo Ortega Perez was reversed by the Superior Court of
Catalonia and, upon retrial, he was convicted of murder.  See La Audiencia de Barcelona tiene que re-
petir un juício con  jurado, LA VANGUARDIA DIGITAL (visited Sept. 28, 1998)
<http://www.vanguardia.es/cgi-bin/nrp_ccr_new/dia-hoy&nnk-vb2832a&sec-soc>; Francesa Peirón, El
jurado rectifica y condena por asesinato al hombre que mató a su mjuer de siete cuchilladas, LA
VANGUARDIA DIGITAL (visited Oct. 3, 1998) <http://www.vanguardia.es/cgi-bin/nrp_ccr_new/dia-
hoy&nnk-vb032/a&sec-soc>.
128. Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 384 (citing Juez firma sentencia de un jurado por im-
perativo legal, IDEAL, June 8, 1997, at 1).  On problems related to the judge’s justifying his or her sen-
tence, see id. at 384-87.
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VII
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict the future of trial by jury in either Russia or Spain.
Despite a constitutional anchor in both countries, a decided lack of enthusiasm
exists on the part of professors, judges, and lawyers as to whether it is an insti-
tution capable of helping to solve the problems plaguing the administration of
justice.  It also remains to be seen whether it will serve as a genuine catalyst in
transforming the criminal trials in both countries into an adversarial proceed-
ing, with increased orality and immediacy and less reliance on the investigative
dossier.
Russia’s new law has been in effect for five years as of November 1, 1998,
yet the institution has not spread beyond the nine original regions.129  From De-
cember 15, 1993 to July 1, 1997, approximately 978 jury trials, involving 1,719
defendants, reached a verdict.130  Defendants requesting to be tried by a jury in
jurisdictions subject to the Regional or Territorial Courts have risen from
20.5% in 1994, to 30.9% in 1995, 37.3% in 1996, and 36.8% in 1997,131 indicating
the increasing popularity of trial by jury at least within one part of the popula-
tion.  The acquittal rate, at 18.2% in 1994, fell to 14.3% in 1995, but then rose
to 19.1% in 1996 and to 22.9% in 1997.132  These numbers must be compared,
however, to general acquittal rates of 1.3% in 1994 and 1.4% in 1995.133  In ad-
dition, many of the jury trials ended in convictions for lesser offenses or in ver-
dicts of lenience or special lenience.134  The relative lenience of Russian juries
can perhaps be explained as a reaction to an excessively severe Soviet criminal
justice system, coupled with profound mistrust among the population of crimi-
nal investigators and police, who are known to engage in brutal coercive tactics
in interrogation and are otherwise distrusted in their testimony.135  The parties
themselves becoming more active in the presentation of evidence and examina-
tion of witnesses may also have led to a higher acquittal rate.
The appellate jurisprudence of the SCRF has radically restricted the jury’s
power to decide issues of mens rea, the pivotal questions in most murder trials,
and aggravating circumstances, which can trigger imposition of the death pen-
alty.  These issues include statutory aggravating circumstances, the issue of in-
tention, affirmative defenses such as necessary defense or heat of passion, and
others.136  In 1994, the SCRF reversed 42.9% of all judgments and 20.1% of all
acquittals, nine total.  While the SCRF reversed only 31.5% of the judgments in
                                                          
129. These nine regions are named supra note 13.
130. See Praktika realizatsii, supra note 27, at 4.
131. See Spravka, supra note 27.
132. See id.
133. See Gagarsky, supra note 41, at 4.
134. See Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 212.
135. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 15, at 66-67, 91-94, 130.
136. I have argued that this could violate Article 20 of the KONST. RF, which guarantees trial by
jury in capital cases.  See Thaman, Das neue russische Geschworenengericht, supra note 15, at 205;
Thaman, Postanovka voprosov, supra note 92, at 10.
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1995 and 22.2% in 1996, it is still reversing a substantial number of acquittals,
17.3% of those appealed in 1995,137 30.7% in 1996, and 48.6% in 1997.138  Not
only does the ability to reverse an acquittal differentiate Russian and Spanish
appellate procedure from that in the United States, but in Russia, the issues
subject to review by appellate courts are not limited by those framed by the ap-
pellants and respondents.  This inquisitorial remnant in the new adversarial
framework has enabled the SCRF to reverse many cases on issues not briefed
by any of the parties.139
Other than the verdict in the Otegi Case, Spanish juries have not been ex-
cessively lenient in their first year.  Of the fifty-two homicide verdicts I ana-
lyzed, the jury followed the recommendation of the public prosecutor thirty-
four times, three of those prosecutorial recommendations for acquittal by rea-
son of insanity.140  The jury followed the more severe recommendation of the
private prosecutor (victim’s representative) only three times.  The jury found
lesser-included offenses of negligent homicide or infliction of injuries not
pleaded by the public prosecutor in seven cases and acquitted ten times, seven
of which were not pleaded by the public prosecutor.141  In two cases, the jury ac-
tually returned a verdict more lenient than that requested by the defense.142
Other commentators have also found only a handful of “deviant verdicts” (that
is, verdicts different than a professional court would have returned) among the
seventy-seven odd trials in the first year of the new institution (May 27, 1996,
through June 1, 1997).143
Of course, one of these “deviant verdicts” was the acquittal of Mikel Otegi,
which riveted the Spanish public’s attention to the new jury courts after the in-
stitution had been neglected following the first trials in May of 1996.  The Otegi
verdict spawned calls by the ruling Popular Party to suspend jury trials in the
Basque Country, because of public consensus that the verdict was not based on
the evidence, but was due to either juror sympathy with the Basque National-
ists or fear of retribution if they convicted the young nationalist sympathizer.
Other reform proposals include (1) changing venue in such cases, (2) elimi-
nating assaults on police officers and other government officials from the list of
crimes subject to the jury court’s jurisdiction, (3) restricting the jury’s role to
deciding only naked factual questions, and leaving the guilt finding and the
findings of mitigating circumstances relating to mental disease or intoxication
to the professional judge, (4) reforming appellate procedures to allow for
                                                          
137. See Praktika realizatsii, supra note 27, at 4; Gagarsky, supra note 41, at 4.
138. See Spravka, supra note 41, at 7-8.
139. See P.A. Lupinskaia, Poriadok obzhalovaniia, oprotestovaniia i proverki, ne vstupivshikh v
zakonnuiu silu prigovorov i postanovleniy, vynesennykh v usloviiakh al´ternativnoy formy sudoproiz-
vodstva, in 3 VESTN. SAR. GOS. AKAD. PRAVA, supra note 73, at 239, 240-41.
140. See Thaman, Spain Returns, supra note 15, at 392-97.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 394 (citing Carmona Ruano & De Paúl, supra note 94, at 18-20; Joaquina Prades,
Juicio al Jurado, EL PAÍS, June 8, 1997, at 3).
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broader appeal of acquittals, and (5) transforming the classic jury into a “mixed
court.”144
The extreme lenience of Spanish law in allowing a defense of not guilty by
reason of complete or temporary insanity, whether due to mental disease or de-
fect, alcohol or drug intoxication, or even any other circumstance of analogous
significance,145 has led to the mounting of such defenses in many of the first
cases.146  While such defenses have been rejected by most juries, the Otegi ac-
quittal could conceivably be an impulse for the Spanish legislature to amend its
law concerning mental excuses as was done in California following the Dan
White verdict and in the federal system following the John Hinckley verdict.
This would be a clear example of how the presence of a jury of lay factfinders
exercises influence on the definition of crimes and their defenses in the sub-
stantive criminal law.
Despite the requirement that murder and certain other cases throughout
Spain be tried by jury, there have as of yet been remarkably few jury trials, with
several provinces not having held a single trial as of May 27, 1997, the first an-
niversary of the first trials.147  Prosecutors have been either charging lesser
crimes or reaching agreements with defendants (conformidad) in the minor
cases of threats, burglary, and bribery to avoid the jurisdiction of the jury
court.148
Even though there have been relatively few jury trials held to date, the re-
appearance of juries on the inquisitorial soil of Continental Europe is an impor-
tant phenomenon, regardless of its reception among law professors, lawyers,
judges, and politicians.  It breathes life into the overly written, overly bureau-
cratic structure of European criminal jurisprudence and makes European ju-
rists rethink the procedural and substantive tenets upon which their criminal
justice systems are based.
                                                          
144. See id. at 405-12 (citing Javier Muñoz, El Gobierno y el PNV abrogan por reformar el jurado
para que no se repitan veredictos “absurdos,” EL CORREO, Mar. 8, 1997; C. Valdecantos, El PP quiere
limitar las competencias del jurado, EL PAÍS, Mar. 8, 1997; Raimundo Castro, El Gobierno cambiará la
Ley del Jurado por el “caso Otegi,” EL PERIÓDICO, Mar. 8, 1997; Ferran Gerhard, Mariscal trabaja ya
en la nueva Ley del Jurado, EL PERIÓDICO, Mar. 9, 1997; Salome García, El Gobierno baraja sustraer
al jurado el ataque a policías,  EL PERIÓDICO, Mar. 11, 1997).  On the post-Otegi reform proposals, see
id. at 405-12.
145. Arts. 20-21 of the Código Penal (B.O.E. 1995, 281).  Most of the first trials were tried under
similar provisions included in the Penal code of 1973, because the 1995 Code went into effect only
three days before the first trials began on May 24, 1996.
146. In my study, such defenses were pleaded in 36 of the 57 homicide cases.  See Thaman, Spain
Returns, supra note 15, at 343 n.444.
147. I am aware of at least seven of Spain’s 50 provinces which had not yet celebrated their first
jury trial as of June 1, 1997—Segovia, Jaen, Cuenca, Cantabria, La Rioja, Soria, and Tarragona.  See
id. at 515-16.
148. See id. at 404.
